We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the n-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," p. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of p; and (b) large values of p. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of p is provided.
Introduction
This paper investigates the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the model of noncooperative bargaining proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992) . The game form studied is defined over the class of cooperative games in coalitional form. For games with transferable utilities (TU games) Hart and Mas-Colell (1992) show that their game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected payoff from which is the Shapley value vector of the underlying coalitional game.
A key feature of the game form proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992) is that it admits the possibility of partial breakdown, that is, situations where only a subset of the players are parties to the final agreement. This results from the novel feature that if a proposing player's offer to the other players is not unanimously accepted, there is an exogenous probability, (1 -p), that the proposer will be removed from the game. The parameter p, denoting the probability that the game will continue with the original set of players, plays much the same role as a discount factor. While the stationary equilibrium does not depend on the parameter p, our analysis reveals that the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs depends crucially on the value of p. In this paper we report three results. All pertain to TU games.
(i) For small values of p, there is a unique perfect equilibrium payoff, the Shapley value payoff vector (Theorem 3.1 below). Thus for small p, restricting attention to stationary perfect equilibria does not restrict the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs.
(ii) When p is close to 1, typically there are multiple perfect equilibrium payoffs. However, the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs is not the same as the set of individually rational payoffs, and thus an implication of this is that in general, there
We are grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell for help and encouragement and to two referees for every helpful comments. v. Krishna and R. Serrano is no "folk theorem" like result for the model at hand. Theorem 3.2 below provides an exact characterization of the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs for large p.
(iii) For the special class of symmetric games, we are able to provide a characterization of the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs for all values of p (Theorem 4.1 below). This result generalizes Shaked's analysis of the n-person pure bargaining problem. 2
We hope the study the set of perfect equilibria associated with NTU games in a subsequent paper.
Preliminaries
Let (N, u) be a TU game in coalitional form. N = { 1, 2, .... n} is the set of players and u : 2 N --* N is the characteristic function defining the game. As always, u(O) = 0. The game (N, u) is assumed to be O-monotonic, that is, for all S C N, and i ~ S, u(S U {i}) -> u(S) + u(i). We also assume that the game has been O-normalized so that for all i, u(i) = 0.
Consider any set S of at least two players. For every i in S, define ti, s as 
